I am a doctoral candidate in the strategy unit at Harvard Business School. I conduct empirical research on technology, organizational design, and top managers.

My work has been covered by The New York Times, The Washington Post, NPR, Slate, Bloomberg, and other national media outlets.

I will be on the academic job market in fall 2017, and expect to graduate in May 2018.

Job Market Paper

Touring an ice cream factory in Brazil.

Who benefits from the adoption of high-speed Internet technology in the workplace? I combine worker-level wage data with information on broadband adoption by Brazilian firms to estimate the effects of broadband on workers in different levels of the organizational hierarchy. Managers’ wages increase when their employers adopt broadband, but wages for workers lower in the organizational hierarchy do not change. There is no net effect on employment. Inequality within the firm therefore increases following broadband adoption. The paper provides the first direct evidence connecting adoption and use of advanced information technology to a widening pay gap within an organization. These results have implications for the management of pay inequality within firms, which prior research has linked to performance, and for public investments in broadband infrastructure.

Draft forthcoming.


  • What Makes the Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving the U.S. Supreme Court and Cross-Listed Firms (with Amir N. Licht, Jordan I. Siegel, and Xi Li)
    Accepted at Journal of Financial Economics

    On March 29, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled its intention to geographically limit the reach of the U.S. securities antifraud regime and thus differentially exclude U.S.-listed foreign firms from the ambit of formal U.S. antifraud enforcement. We use this legal surprise as a natural experiment to test the legal bonding hypothesis. This event nonetheless was met with positive or indifferent market reactions based on matched samples, Brown-Warner, and portfolio analyses. These results challenge the value of at least the U.S. civil liability regime, as currently designed, as a legal bonding mechanism in such firms.

  • The Impact of Mass Shootings on Gun Policy (with Michael Luca and Deepak Malhotra)
    R&R at Journal of Public Economics

    There have been dozens of high-profile mass shootings in recent decades. This paper presents three main findings about the impact of mass shootings on gun policy. First, mass shootings evoke large policy responses. A single mass shooting leads to a 15% increase in the number of firearm bills introduced within a state in the year after a mass shooting. This effect increases with the number of fatalities. Second, mass shootings account for a small portion of all gun deaths, but have an outsized influence relative to other homicides. Our estimates suggest that the per-death impact of mass shootings on bills introduced is about 80 times as large as the impact of individual gun homicides in non-mass shooting incidents. Third, when looking at enacted laws, the impact of mass shootings depends on the party in power. A mass shooting increases the number of enacted laws that loosen gun restrictions by 75% in states with Republican-controlled legislatures. We find no significant effect of mass shootings on laws enacted when there is a Democrat-controlled legislature.

  • Handgun Waiting Periods Reduce Gun Violence (with Michael Luca and Deepak Malhotra)
    R&R at Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

    Handgun waiting periods are laws that impose a delay between the initiation of a purchase and final acquisition of a firearm. By creating a “cooling off” period, waiting periods might reduce the incidence of gun violence in cases where the buyer was motivated to purchase a firearm due to a transitory emotional state (e.g., anger). We estimate the impact of waiting periods on gun deaths, exploiting all changes to state-level policies in the Unites States since 1978. We find that waiting periods reduce gun homicides by roughly 16%. We provide further support for the causal impact of waiting periods on homicides by exploiting a natural experiment resulting from a federal law in 1994 that imposed a temporary waiting period on a subset of states.

  • How and When Does Hierarchy Emerge in Firms? (with Megan Lawrence)

    Despite understanding that formal structure within firms is crucial for maintaining coordination and control as young firms grow, relatively little is systematically known about the initial formation of hierarchy in firms. By exploiting access to a dataset of all employees within all firms in Brazil between 2004 and 2014, we test and find support for factors that may contribute to the genesis of middle management using theories developed regarding information processing, initial founding conditions, and external environmental conditions. We also capture hires into specific functional areas and find that established theories are less predictive of the emergence of specialized managers. Above all, the size of the firm appears to have the strongest effect on the emergence of hierarchy in young firms.

  • Citizens' Perceptions and the Disconnect Between Economics and Regulatory Policy (with Jonathan Baron and William T. McEnroe)
    In Regulatory Breakdown: The Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation. Ed. Cary Coglianese. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

    Economic theory is clear about the advantages and disadvantages of various ways of regulating negative externalities, such as command and control, cap and trade, taxation, subsidies, and tort law. Yet public policy rarely follows the recommendations that follow from the theory. For example, the standard recommendations for reducing CO2 emissions involve carbon taxes or some form of cap and trade, but discussions of "realistic" ways to reduce emissions in the U.S. have involved mileage standards, command and control regulation of power plants, and tax subsidies for energy efficiency. In democracies such as the U.S., policies must have at least some public support. Citizens' limited understanding of the economics of regulation can lead to lack of support for optimal policies. In studies on the World Wide Web, we document some failures, and some successes, of ordinary citizens to think through the economics of alternative policies. Among other issues, we examine understanding of the secondary effects of taxation vs. subsidies, and understanding of the role of limited information (on the part of polluters, or governments) in the choice between command-and-control regulation and tort law or taxation.

  • Occupational Licensing and Service Quality
    Data analysis stage
  • Why Do Workers Flow Within Firm Boundaries? Evidence From Microdata (with Jasmina Chauvin)
    Data analysis stage


  • Teaching Fellow, Economic Analysis of Public Policy
    Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government
    Teaching Evaluation
  • Case Study Sessions (Summer 2016 and Summer 2017)
    Program for Research in Markets & Organizations
    Teaching Evaluation